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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 06-4261
________________
BAMBANG SUGIARTO
                                                Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE UNITED STATES,
                                                  Respondent
________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
U.S. Department of Justice
BIA File No. A96-262-847
Honorable Rosalind K. Molloy
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 6, 2007
BEFORE McKEE, CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed:    January 14, 2008)
________________
OPINION
________________
MCKEE, Circuit Judge.
2Bambang Sugiarto petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ order affirming the Immigration Judge’s denial of his request for
withholding of removal. For the reasons stated below, we will deny the petition for
review.  
Since we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, we
need not reiterate the factual or procedural background. 
Although we are sympathetic to the tribulations Sugiarto has endured, we
agree that he has not established that the BIA erred in denying relief.  In Konan v.
Attorney General, 432 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2005), we stated that “[m]ere generalized
lawlessness and violence between diverse populations, of the sort which abounds
in numerous countries and inflicts misery upon millions of innocent people daily
around the world, generally is not sufficient to permit the Attorney General to
grant asylum...” Id. at 506.  
Here, Sugiarto’s evidence amounts to nothing more than such “generalized
lawlessness and violence.”  Although evidence that a tree in his yard was cut down
tends to support an argument that he and/or his family may have been specifically
targeted on occasion, his evidence still falls woefully short of the level required to
establish that he is a “refugee” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), or the required
“persecution.”  “[T]he concept of persecution does not encompass all treatment
that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.” 
Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993).  Rather, the evidence amounting
3to nothing more than “mere generalized lawlessness and violence between diverse
populations” does not meet the standard of eligibility for withholding.  See Zubeda
v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 2003). Sugiarto is also not able to establish
the required governmental involvement or acquiescence in the actions he
complains of.  See Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 2003).
Sugiarto’s attempt to base his claim for relief on the general persecution of
Chinese Christians in Indonesia also fails to satisfy his burden.   In Lie v. Ashcroft,
396 F.3d 530 (3d Cir. 2005), we discussed whether an alien can establish a well-
founded fear of persecution based on a pattern or practice of persecution of a
specific group.  396 F.3d at 537.  We stated that the persecution had to be
“systematic, pervasive, or organized.”  Id.  
Sugiarto relies on various Department of State Country Reports in arguing
that “the Indonesian government has not demonstrated a willingness or ability to
control the virulent and violent anti-Chinese and anti-Christian sentiment of
significant portions of its population.” Appellant’s Br. at 13.  He also points to de
jure discrimination such as KTP national identity cards and laws that “put the
ethnic Chinese in a second class status.”  Id.  Although this treatment is unfair and
unjust, it still does not rise to the level of  “persecution.” See Fatin,  12 F.3d at
1240.  Moreover, the IJ had the benefit of the 2004 reports which note that
“[i]nstances of discrimination and harassment of ethnic Chinese Indonesians
declined compared with previous years,” A.R. at 41; the Indonesian government
4“cracked down” on those who carried out religious attacks, A.R. 44; and “[s]ome
notable advances in inter-religious tolerance and cooperation occurred during the
period covered by the report.” A.R. 44.  We also note that Sugiarto’s family still
resides in Indonesia, and he does not allege that they are suffering persecution.  
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
